Abstract Taking as its provocation Leo Bersani's fleeting turn to questions of ecology at the end of his 2002 essay "Sociability and Cruising," this piece asks what it would mean to use the practice of cruising as an unexpected model for a new ecological ethic, one more deeply attuned to our impersonal intimacies with the human, nonhuman, and elemental strangers that constitute both our environment and ourselves. In order to develop such a model, the essay looks not only to Bersani's work but also (and primarily) to Samuel R. Delany's Times Square Red, Times Square Blue, whose attention to the positive fallout of spontaneous cross-class contact, I claim, complicates the proprietary, insular, and paranoid logics prevalent in much popular environmental discourse. Delany's text, which decenters both intention and identity in its definition of the social, limns the contours of a queer environmentalism predicated less on intentional, direct(ed) investment than on ambient affects, impersonal futures, and nonteleological practices of care.
discourse.
7 As Delany's text brushes near Bersani's and next to contemporary environmental writings (with which it might have more in common than either field is ready to acknowledge), 8 it limns the contours of a queer environmentalism predicated less on direct(ed) investment than on ambient affects, impersonal futures, and nonteleological practices of care. Ultimately, I will argue, in tracing how intimacy, impersonality, and consequence disperse throughout urban space and across various measures of time,
Delany offers us new ways to understand what Timothy Morton has called the "politicized intimacy with other beings" 9 that constitutes contemporary ecological relations as such. The result is an environmental ethic that acknowledges the extent to which ecological entanglement resembles the queer relationality of cruising far more than it does the other (more normative) relational paradigms to which we so often analogize it.
Cruising's Queer Ecology
Drawing on the work of sociologist Georg Simmel, Bersani's essay rehearses the fundamental distinction between society-predicated on interests and identities-and sociability, in which an impersonal mode of being facilitates something akin to "pure relationality" and fosters the feeling "of association as such" ("Sociability and Cruising," 45).
Sociability, according to Bersani's account of Simmel, "abstract[s] the relational from concrete relations," granting us access to "the pleasure of the associative process," to "a pure relationality" that dwells "beyond or before the satisfaction of particular needs or interests" (45) (46) . While such bracketing of the personal-which, in Bersani's account, entails the renunciation of both possession and any acquisitive impulse-requires a sacrifice, it is also "pleasurable," its "satisfaction inherent"; for within sociability, each one of us, like the woman who becomes one of Simmel's examples, is "'not completely
[one]self'" but rather "only an element in a formally constituted gathering" (46, 47) . "It is as if there is a happiness inherent in not being entirely ourselves," Bersani suggests, provocatively, "in being 'reduced' to an impersonal rhythm" (47). And like the self, no longer driven by acquisitive impulse, this happiness or pleasure "does not serve an interest, satisfy a passion, or fulfill a desire. It is an intransitive pleasure intrinsic to a certain mode of existence, to a self-subtracted being" (48).
Although cruising and sociability themselves are immanent, nonteleological practices, Bersani wishes his theorization of the terms to reach beyond itself; he insists that attending seriously to cruising "is not a question of demonstrating that certain outrageous practices are really taking place within the parameters of a traditional ethics, but rather of specifying the ways in which those practices may or may not require us to elaborate new ethical vocabularies" (60). If one of the goals of the current essay is to pursue such an elaboration, it seems important to acknowledge that in many respects
Delany has beaten us-and Bersani himself-to the punch. Although TSRTSB precedes "Sociability and Cruising" by three years, it often reads as a response to Bersani's variously articulated challenges, not only in its articulation of "new ethical vocabularies" but also in its attention to ways of life-and forms of civic investment-predicated on the culture of cruising in the 42nd Street movie houses and the peep shows of the "old"
Times Square.
10
Indeed, for Delany, eroticism, sexual contact, and open expressions of desire are fundamental to the democratic potential of the spaces in which we dwell. Throughout TSRTSB, he establishes the links-or, to use one of his own favorite terms, the "propinquity"-between casual sexual contact and casual nonsexual encounters. While he is not invested in the nonhuman world per se (although, as my discussion will illuminate, the emphasis on ambient conditions in his conception of the cityscape puts him in implicit conversation with environmental thought), his thinking is ecological insofar as it takes seriously the capacity of seemingly casual, localized, and contingent relational practices to circulate throughout the broader social milieu in which they transpire.
11 We thus might argue that TSRTSB theorizes a kind of sexual ecology, a term that I borrow from Gabriel Rotello, whose 1997 book of the same name has been deemed "the Silent Spring of the AIDS epidemic." 12 Sexual Ecology analyzes AIDS as an ecological phenomenon, arguing that the "enemy" is not the disease itself but rather the conditions that facilitate its spread. Sexual ecology, as Rotello defines it, thus "consists of the entire spectrum of causes and effects that influence the spread of sexually transmitted 10. TSRTSB is, of course, also an elegy for a Times Square that no longer exists as well as a fervent critique of those sociopolitical forces (including the Times Square redevelopment project's capacity to capitalize [literally] on the fear of contact that flourished in the wake of HIV/AIDS) that brought about its demise. Although the book is thus suffused with a sense of loss, Delany's experiences ultimately serve as a source less of melancholy than of a utopian faith in the promise of urban democratic life. His work thus fits both the temporal and the affective models that interest José Esteban Muñoz in Cruising Utopia. There, Muñoz calls on readers to engage in a model of attention "that . . . resembles a kind of politicized cruising" in order to glimpse "the anticipatory illumination of the utopian" (18). 11. In so doing, Delany demonstrates anew the relevance of urban spaces and practices to environmental and ecocritical thought, fields that-despite the changing foci of critical attention-still tend to be dominated by more familiarly "natural" spaces. 12. Rotello, Sexual Ecology. The comparison to Silent Spring comes from Biddle, "Grim Warning on AIDS in the 90s." Nyong'o, "Back to the Garden," also uses the phrase "sexual ecologies" (747), but does not engage Rotello.
1 5 2 Environmental Humanities 9:1 / May 2017 diseases"; 13 as he goes on to insist, "To begin the process of envisioning a sustainable gay lifestyle that can encourage gay liberation and avoid epidemic disease over the long haul, we have to learn to think ecologically about sex." 14 TSRTSB, I would argue, also helps us "learn to think ecologically about sex"-not, as
Rotello would have it, by tracing the contextual contours of a sexually transmitted disease so as to limit its spread but rather by revealing the way that intimacy, community, and care themselves spread in the spatiotemporal wake of casual sexual activity.
Whereas Rotello's response to HIV mandates a largely prophylactic and risk-averse approach to erotic life-including a commitment to monogamy and a reduction in cruisingDelany, inversely, advocates an embrace of contact, positing it as fundamental to the vitality not only of individual subjects but also, and more profoundly, of the urban environment itself. The difference between the writers' approaches, then, might have repercussions not only for the status of cruising but also, importantly, for the orientation of environmental activism. If Rotello seeks to change casual sexual practice by aligning it with a chaste, "mature," and restrained environmentalism, Delany, I want to suggest, can inspire a change in that same environmentalism by inviting it to attend to the impersonal, collateral, and insistently ambient effects of casual relationships.
15
Although Delany never directly engages ecology as such, his text is predicated upon close attention to "a complex of interlocking systems and subsystems" (TSRTSB, xx), to the way in which "social interchanges of information and material occur in various forms of social nets" (122), to how interclass contact becomes "the lymphatic system of a democratic metropolis" (199). Ultimately, he encourages us "to look not so much at social objects and social monuments but to observe, analyze, and value a whole range of social relationships" (177).
16
Among the social relationships that concern Delany is the relationship between practices of cruising-or public sex more generally-and the forms of spontaneous cross-class contact fundamental to the livability and democratic health of urban spaces.
The distinction that Bersani (via Simmel) draws between society and sociability finds its analog in Delany's differentiation between the roles that two forms of social-net 13. Rotello, Sexual Ecology, 16. 14. Ibid., 189.
15. In Rotello's argument, it takes HIV to make sexuality ecological; he understands erotic contact in terms of an ecological system only when that contact is pathologized. Within his conception of ecology, then, queer eroticism is legible only as a threat-and cruising and casual sex, insofar as they contribute to pathogens' "spread," constitute the greatest threat of all. But TSRTSB demonstrates the ways in which sexuality is already ecological, in which its effects disperse and roam in nonpathological-and often beneficial-ways. Although the current essay does not have the space to take up the relationship between HIV/AIDS and environmentalism, the broader project of which it is a part does just that.
16. My reading of these paradigms as ecological dovetails with Jane Bennett's definitions of ecology in Vibrant Matter. In her account, ecology is a "complicated web of dissonant connections between bodies" (4) and an "interconnected series of parts, but . . . not a fixed order of parts, for the order is always being reworked in accordance with a certain 'freedom of choice' exercised by its actants" (97). Importantly, cruising here is just one example-if a privileged one-of the routine forms of spontaneous contact between strangers that Delany understands to have been compromised by the sanitizing "redevelopment" of Times Square and the privatization of urban space more broadly. Indeed, the rhetorical power of the passage consists in how scenes that we understand as constitutive of the daily culture of any American city come to touch the nonnormative, "fringe" practices of public sex and how scenes specific to 1980s New York burgeon within (or diffuse into) a more conventional portrait of 17. It would be a misrepresentation of Delany's book to overstate the distinction between networking and contact. Indeed, I would argue that TSRTSB demonstrates the extent to which contact is not the negation of personalized relations (including those involved in networking) but rather the precondition for them. Thus we might read networking (and/or the relationships it involves) as the privatization of contact; networking is a way to attempt to contain or enclose contact, to give it predictable shape and teleological direction by delimiting/ predetermining the kinds of people included in a social network. Although I do not have space in these pages to take up Delany's treatment of class in as much detail as it deserves, I want to suggest that his investment in nonproprietary forms of relation is, relatedly, a way of resisting two intertwined forms of privatization-(a) the emphasis on private (or secured and privatized) property at the expense of truly public urban spaces and (b) the reification of personal identity (and its accompanying forms of identitarian sociality) (TSRTSB).
18. Ibid., 123-24. American urbanity. The passage thus suggests not only that contact is what cruising becomes as it disperses across time, space, and publics to become a common way of life but also that scenes of public sex, if not a prerequisite for these more familiar, banal encounters, nevertheless index contact's own (im)possibility. At its best, Delany suggests, a city is a realm where we all find ourselves (knowingly or not) beckoned to cruise.
Thus the passage as a whole represents, in microcosm, the most powerful aspects of cruising's queer ecology. First, we might notice the complicated temporality in which contact inheres. Meaningful-and fleeting-encounters typically take place in spaces of suspension. They happen "while the clerk is changing the paper roll in the cash register."
They happen as the neighbor takes a break on the stoop or as "semiofficials" forestall various responsibilities-expanding, however gently, the time of the task. They happen in the marginal furrows of society, in the space of "waste" and pleasure as opposed to the time of duty or (re)production. Indeed, whereas networking is instrumental (Delany's paradigmatic example is writers angling for book deals at conferences), the future of contact is starkly impersonal: "I have forgotten your name." Contact and cruising are realms in which anonymity and impersonality can be the ground of intimacy rather than barriers to it, where nonknowledge of our variably significant others can be a state that endures.
Likewise, rather than simply emphasizing the fleetingness of casual encounters, they have in common, as other scenes from the book illustrate more fully, is the way in which they-the fading, the remaining, the devolving, the burgeoning-suffuse the spaces in which they take place and make urban life livable.
At the same time that Delany's points are insistent, they are also necessarily nonprogrammatic. For he advocates not particular identity categories, actions, or practices but rather a posture of openness to chance, a willingness to acknowledge that we cannot possibly know what will come of any given encounter. The passage above, perhaps unsurprisingly, is awash in language of contingency: not only the "may" and "may not" through which Delany traces the uncertain contours of consequence but also the repeated refrain "it can be," which gestures toward the impossibility of predicting what forms contact might or will take. We cannot know in advance what will last or fade, how we may feel lasting traces of the fading, or how forgetting itself may become a form of relation. We do not know how what "devolve[s]" may still permeate our daysnot as an absence experienced with longing or regret or melancholy but as a diminished persistence that, having become more part of our substance (and our surroundings) than of our memories, affects our daily experience of the world. 20 We forget about many of those whom we encounter until we see them again on a street corner, until chance brings them back into our life narrative and begins to articulate the ways in which they may have been there-invisibly, anonymously, ambiently, materially-all along.
Ecological Lessness; or, Environmentalism without Environmentalists
The anonymity central to cruising is, for both Bersani and Delany, not an exceptional condition but rather a constitutive one. Indeed, it is not simply others who remain anonymous but also, importantly, ourselves. Such identitarian lessness is, for Bersani, the source of sociability's pleasure and, for Delany, the wellspring of urban democratic ethics. To understand lessness as the site of such an ethically impersonal pleasure-or of a pleasurably impersonal ethics-is to begin to trace the contours of its environmental significance.
As the opening salvo of this essay indicated, paradigms of lessening are hardly unfamiliar to mainstream environmentalism. But whereas the latter's investment in lessness relates almost entirely to the actions that we take (or fail to take) under the banner of "restraint," Bersani's psychoanalytic lessness is ontological, pertaining to the realm of being, not doing, less. While Bersani suggests that there can be a happiness "inherent in not being entirely ourselves," the logic of environmentalism often urges us to be more ourselves (often by doing, consuming, and demanding less), turning planetary stewardship into an extension and intensification of our identitarian commitments.
21
Furthermore, even when environmental stewardship is not specifically identitarian, those imploring us to action tend to rely on language of shared values, appealing
19. Sedgwick, "Paranoid Reading," 149.
20. See Carson, Silent Spring; and Nixon, Slow Violence. I will return to the unexpected link between TSRTSB and Nixon's work later in the essay.
21. Choose any identity category through which we understand ourselves and there exists a way to yoke our environmental investments to it. Sandra Steingraber, writing a guide to child rearing in a time of planetary degradation, proclaims that "ultimately, the environmental crisis is a parenting crisis" (Raising Elijah, 281).
LGBT Weekly instructs us in "Finding the Gay in Green." The Acton Institute maintains a long list of faith-based environmental groups. The examples could go on seemingly indefinitely. Such a stance is, perhaps, the logical extension of environmental writing and activism's broader tendency-and need-to personalize and personify the planet in order to (urge us to) invest in its endurance. But rather than finding increasingly personal lines of appeal, we might instead seek to develop an environmentalism that divests, depersonalizes, and perhaps even defaces human action-precisely in order to begin reckoning with those queer animacies and agencies that constitute the natural world. For when we relate to "the environment," we are relating to-and acknowledging our imbrication with-the inanimate, the geologic, the distant, the invisible, the systemic, the strange. 23. Alaimo, "MCS Matters," 11. The resulting consubstantiality has led critics like Morton to claim that "there is no environment as such" (Morton, "Thinking Ecology, " 272) . I choose to retain the term environment (even while acknowledging Morton's point) because I believe so doing helps us to think through the paradigms of relation that we practice toward the world around and within us-even if, or perhaps especially if, the fact of our indistinguishability from the "environment" means that some of these paradigms prove to be autoaffective.
24. For a related theorization of the "radical asymmetry between the natural and the social," see Clark,
Inhuman Nature, 30. There, Nigel Clark considers "what . . . it mean[s] to say that life, or the earth, or nature or the universe are not just constellations of material and energy with which humans forge connections, but realities upon which we are utterly dependent-in ways that are out of all proportion to life, nature, the earth or the universe's dependence on us" (ibid.).
Ensor / Delany and the Ecology of Cruising
Such a model, of course, already exists within these theorizations of cruising, which seek-to borrow Bersani's language-to "conceptualize a sociality no longer imprisoned within identitarian ideologies" ("Sociability and Cruising," 50). Cruising's impersonal intimacies thus can help us to develop a disanthropocentric ecological imagination, as material ecocritics insist we must: not (or not only) by articulating the forms of queer agency immanent to nominally "inanimate" entities but rather (or also) by demonstrating how human relations might themselves already be more disanthropomorphic than we are wont to think. For, as Jane Bennett insists, not only is matter vibrant, but due to our entanglement and mutual constitution with it and due to "the extent to which human being and thinghood overlap," "we are also nonhuman."
25 If, in elucidating the implications of such a claim, Serenella Iovino and Serpil Opperman cast matter as embodying "a form of 'emergent' agency that is combined and interferes with every 'intentional' human agency"-meaning that "none of our intentional acts is limited to the sphere of 'pure' intentionality" 30. Morton, similarly, claims that "ecological . . . interdependence implies that there is less to things than meets the eye. Yet this lessness means that we can never grasp beings as such" ("Guest Column," 277; emphasis added).
This paradigm precludes neither investment nor care; rather, it simply depersonalizes them. In the anthropological essay that constitutes the first half of TSRTSB, Delany makes a rare turn to his life beyond Times Square, recalling his mother's stroke, which left her "a creature wholly alien yet recognizable in fifty little ways-a hand gesture, a shake of the head, a sudden single phrase ('I know') muttered thirty-seven times, a smile, a moue-as the subject . . . she once was" (52). If a stroke inaugurates a falling off from full subjectivity, leaving in its wake a once familiar person now recognizable only in those "fifty little [gestural] ways," then life in the movie houses suggests a model of relationality predicated upon those tendencies, one where gesture or act is not understood as a trace of the whole subjectivity it fails to reach but rather as the sufficient ground of familiarity. For the men in the theaters, "fixtures" (73) and "regulars"
(15), are less characters than they are characteristic habits or postures. They are sometimes professions and names and proclivities but rarely more than that; the trajectory of intimacy that burgeons in the theaters leads one to "recognize . . . faces" and develop Here, partial (metonymic) knowledge is not a step on the way to "completeness" but rather a mode of ethical relation all its own. What Delany invests in, then, is less any one of these men (although he does develop ongoing relationships with some) than the broader culture that they collectively inhabit and the pleasure that they share.
Throughout, Delany attends less to beings or things than to the medial dimension-the common dimension of contact-in which such encounters transpire and in which their effects persist. In this shift toward an objectless (or intransitive) mode of care, Delany's account of cruising begins to feel more directly ecological, insofar as it prioritizes the atmosphere in which relationality itself inheres. This dimension of contact-partial, textured, sensory, seemingly ephemeral-is, like the "overall pleasurable social fabric"
and "general sense of social well-being" that he references in his discussion of Jacobs, at times hard to pin down, but it is no less central to our experience for that (126).
Smog, we might remind ourselves, is not the only thing that can hang over cities and alter the way in which we see our world.
Indeed, the effects that such contact produces are insistently ambient, dispersed, diffuse, incomplete. They embody the "field and force" that "human beings [can] share"; they have "flavor" and "form"; the pleasure foundational to them "color[s]" all other aspects of the encounters and their milieu. Rather than relating to one another dyadically, and rather than each being a discrete node in a social network, these men environ one another, their relationships valuable (and socially relevant) precisely insofar as they fail to be permanent, localized, defined, or proprietary. What if environmental stewardship were understood as a dispersed set of practices, affiliations, affects, and animacies-some long-lasting, some fleeting, some deliberate, some entirely accidental? What would it look like to acknowledge a broader range of practices as "ecological" and to deem fewer-or, alternatively, far more-people "envi- terms, we could acknowledge the ethical importance of a casual environmentalism, an amateur environmentalism, a playful environmentalism, and even an accidental environmentalism-all of them predicated on an ecological understanding that the casual is no less powerful, and ultimately no less causal, than are the deliberate and the premeditated.
Casual Causality
To argue that we could practice an environmentalism divested from deliberate longterm aims is, perhaps, to commit sacrilege. Although trying to articulate truisms about the environmental movement is a losing battle, if occasionally a heuristically necessary one, most environmentalists would agree that our commitment to the planet is a longterm affair. And not an affair, really, but more like a marriage: for better or worse, until death do us part-and beyond. TSRTSB's most obvious challenge to such an imperative comes in its embrace of the fleeting; however, its more powerful intervention involves its elaboration of paradigms of indirect consequence. For environmentalism's investment in longevity tends to be predicated upon a normative understanding of a causality presumed to function in a largely knowable, linear way-and to render the desired future achievable in turn. Environmentalist writing thus tends to fear surprise; precaution and prevention (not only of harm and damage but also of the unknown and the unexpected as such) rule the day.
By contrast, Delany, ostensibly bracketing questions of permanence and longevity, demonstrates paradigms of investment that inhere in the absence of readily recognized endurance and teaches us how to position ourselves relative to forms of consequence whose bounds exceed certainty, intention, and control. 34 As he inhabits an intransitive posture, one that cruises and wanders rather than being determined by particular goals or ends, Delany attends to co-incidence as such; in so doing, he traces the way in which the overlap of the casual and the causal conditions democratic community and ethical relations alike. Whereas an environmentalism predicated on prevention and control insists (like Sedgwick's model of paranoid reading) that "no horror, however apparently unthinkable, shall ever come to [us] as new," 35 Delany suggests that we make and remake our worlds precisely out of consequences that we could not possibly intend or anticipate and that we perhaps cannot even experience as such. Just as his urban encounters are sometimes fleeting and sometimes more permanent (and sometimes recur, enduring precisely in or as their temporariness), the results of contact are, for him, sometimes positive and sometimes deleterious, sometimes life altering and sometimes utterly inconsequential, and most often somewhere in between. The exact nature of an encounter's significance is frequently indeterminate, both because he is often unaware of his interlocutor's path after they part ways ("not all tales end in premature death or incarceration. For most, indeed, we never learn an end at all" [TSRTSB, 48] ) and because causality itself is often delayed, indirect, and unpredictable, particularly in the context of these casual encounters. Indeed, Delany insists that it is often precisely because encounters or interactions are fleeting, minimal, and casual that their consequence can build.
To insist that causality is always at least in part casual is not to advocate that we renounce intent or deliberateness and welcome whatever may come to pass. Rather, Delany's model suggests that we stop reifying outcomes (and the presumed predictability of a course of action that could help us reach them) and focus on cultivating the conditions of possibility for a democratic social ecology. For while he repeatedly emphasizes that "the nature of the social practices [he is] investigating is such that specific benefits and losses cannot be systematized, operationalized, standardized, or predicted" (169; emphasis added), and while these interactions' socioaffective power stems largely from the fact that they arise unbidden, Delany does insist that "what [he is] proposing is that we utilize consciously the same principles of socioeconomic diversity through which those pleasant, various, and stable neighborhoods that were never planned grew not "belong" to (or in) the neighborhood, who are not names or stories or identities but rather bodies and postures and garments, relational paradigms and ethnic/racial/ socioeconomic types ("a heavy, white-haired plainclothes policeman"; "two women . . . , one in a brown raincoat, both in hats"; a "father and two kids, son and daughter"; "a homeless man in his twenties with blackened hands and short black hair"; "an older Hispanic gentleman in an overcoat, with a pencil-thin mustache" ). It is these anonymous figures-and the fleeting interactions they (and Delany) share-that leave a trace (or a tail through the night sky).
So what if those of us invested in environmentalism acknowledged what we might be loath to admit-that the earth can never be our primary relationship? For in virtually all respects, environmentalism's gains are not direct but collateral-a term that we are accustomed to using to describe damage, not improvement. Saving the planet, even if that is our goal, can only ever be collateral to our efforts, can only ever be an indirect effect of other practices. In other words: we cannot save the earth. We can do x, y, and z and hope that they add up to meaningful change. We can do x, y, and z and hope that Ensor / Delany and the Ecology of Cruisingothers we do not know-the anonymous fellow denizens of this moment and the even more radically anonymous denizens of moments yet to come-do p, q, and r. Stewardship is not simply about those metonymic gestures addressed earlier but also about impersonal interactions, about acknowledging the ways in which our planetary fatewhatever we do or however we identify-is yoked to the agency of strangers (human and nonhuman), to the contingent relationship between intent and outcome, to the even more complicated relationship between unintentional actions and their ultimate end. Endurance is only ever going to come as a result of a confluence of circumstances.
Our contribution is only ever going to be provisional, partial, and minor. Our task, then, may be not to get into the business of saving but rather to ask ourselves a series of questions that are no less important for being a bit more diminutive: How are we to relate to a job that is only ever partially and contingently done? How do we build a political movement responsive to accident, to the collateral, to the unintentional? How do we learn to value the things that happen secondarily-whose outcomes lie beyond the reach of our control, and beyond the reach of our intent? And how might we thus acknowledge the fact that the secondary need not be devalued but rather differently valued, requiring different paradigms of engagement-and yielding different forms of benefit-than those we associate with our primary relationships? What if, rather than analogizing environmental stewardship to the forms of care that we already know how to practice, 36 we trained ourselves-and each other-in these?
Coda: Queer Fallout
Although the term fallout itself appears only these two times in TSRTSB, its resonanceslike those of so many of the local moments that Delany depicts-characteristically spread. For we might say that the book's meditations urge us primarily to consider how forms of pleasure and sociability (not just toxins) can yield fallout and how benefit (not just damage) can unfurl collaterally. In the passage about Hale-Bopp, pleasantness is the queer fallout of casual encounter; more broadly, pleasantness-an adjective that Delany defines as "pleasure in its most generalized form" (121) and that suffuses the text (appearing thirty-nine times, with increasing density)-is the queer fallout of desire's free expression. A healthy, diverse, safe 37 New York City is the queer fallout of a Times Square where movie houses and other spaces conducive to pleasure intersperse with a range of small businesses. A livable life is the queer fallout of a net of casual 36. Here I am thinking not only of familial relationships (as in the rhetoric of "Mother Earth") but also, more generally, of environmentalism's emphasis on love (as in the rhetoric of "love the planet"). Delany's text, importantly, demonstrates how care inheres in the absence of "love relationships" (TSRTSB, 57). It is not, certainly, that love is irrelevant to environmental stewardship but rather that love need not necessarily be privileged among affects that accompany and engender care. 37. I use these ideologically loaded terms as a way of gesturing toward Delany's project of redefining words we think we already know. Safe is chief among them (see esp. TSRTSB, 121-22), but the others also figure into his text.
1 6 4 Environmental Humanities 9:1 / May 2017 encounters that, on their own, often seem to yield little of immediate consequence. Sustained ethical investment in the environment(s) where we live-and the wide-ranging communities that comprise them-is the queer fallout of forms of contact that seem to require less commitment than coincidence.
And to extend such provocations beyond the bounds of Delany's own argumentto consider, in other words, how his pages' resonances spread-we might argue that an environmental ethic more thoroughly engaged with urban space, with impersonality, with sociability and pleasure, with material entanglements and disanthropocentric possibilities could be the queer fallout of attending seriously to TSRTSB and of collectively acknowledging of the possibilities that Delany proposes. For if we expand the scale of our gaze, loosen our own proprietary attachments to the texts that we think of as being germane to our field, and open ourselves more fully to contingency and surprise, we might realize (perhaps with a start!) that those of us invested in environmental activism and ecological thought have in fact been cruising the planet all along.
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